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Beyond the Grant: How the W. K. Kellogg
Foundation Went Beyond Grantmaking
to Contribute to a Major Early Childhood
Initiative
Stephen Greeley, M.S., and Beth Greeley, M.S., DCA, Inc.

Introduction
The SPARK (Supporting Partnerships to Assure
Ready Kids) initiative was one of the largest, in
scope and duration, ever undertaken by WKKF.
The ambition of SPARK was to discover how to
stem the tide of children who arrive at kindergarten each year unprepared to learn and, thus, start
with a handicap that they might never overcome;
half the academic gap seen in grade 12 can be attributed to gaps that existed in first grade (Heckman, 2006). As one superintendent involved in
the initiative put it, “When children show up in
kindergarten with no pre-literacy skills, it’s like
we’re already seeing who our eventual dropouts
will be.”

Key Points

SPARK also served as a first step for WKKF in
moving away from traditional grantmaking toward a more activist role as a change maker. This
article examines the SPARK initiative in that way.
Foundations seeking to achieve large-scale social
progress are in a uniquely challenging position.
They can bring funding, knowledge, visibility,
influence, and a broad perspective to the issues
they take on. Yet, the activities that yield change
are usually in the hands of grantees and others.
Foundations face a balancing act between inspiring and supporting grantees to dictating and micromanaging, between staying in the background
and lending a credible voice. SPARK proved a
dynamic way for the Kellogg Foundation to tackle
those issues.

· A foundation that intends to create change must
be prepared to take responsibility for results and
create the internal structures that promote accountability and collaboration. The nature of the
SPARK effort called for abandoning the silos of
portfolio management and developing a new collaborative approach.

This article is based on a report prepared for
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· The seven-year SPARK (Supporting Partnerships
to Assure Ready Kids) initiative, created by the
W. K. Kellogg Foundation (WKKF), aimed at systemically linking the pre-K and kindergarten worlds
as a way to position vulnerable children for greater
success in the early grades.
· At the foundation, the initiative served as a departure point for WKKF to move from its traditional
grantmaking role to a changemaker role.
· To create change, a foundation must articulate
– and commit to – a point of view about how
change can occur. A theory of change can be a
powerful tool to guide ongoing planning and action.

· Foundations must be prepared to advocate for
change, and bring their visibility, credibility, knowledge, and convening power to it.

WKKF by DCA, Inc., a consulting organization that specializes in guiding efforts to achieve
large-scale social progress. DCA was engaged
by WKKF to assist grantees and foundation
staff over the course of the initiative. The report
presented a candid assessment of what went well
and what didn’t work well in the SPARK initiative
in terms of the new ways foundation manage-
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ment interacted with grantees, provided technical
assistance, and took on a more visible advocate’s
role in order to achieve a significant impact in
advancing children’s school readiness.1

The Environment
School readiness was a fairly well-established
concept when SPARK began. Research abounded
on the skills that are essential to children’s success in kindergarten and beyond.2 As seen by
the emergence of childcare rating systems and
advances in early-childhood education (ECE)
accreditation, policymakers and early childhood
educators increasingly strove for higher-quality
programs to prepare young students for kindergarten (National Governors Association, 2005).
Schools welcomed the prospect of gathering children in who were better prepared to succeed. But
each system continued to circle in separate orbits.
Few3 were actively wading into that space between preschool education and the early elementary grades and the very idea of bridging the gap
between preschool and kindergarten was controversial. On a fundamental level, the concept trod
on entrenched perceptions about professionalism,
The authors reviewed the original internal SPARK
proposal, a visioning statement, grantee reports, a WKKF
Foundation/Education Commission of the States SPARK
overview, an internal WKKF SPARK comprehensive historical review, DCA’s own reports, the Walter R. McDonald
& Associates Resource Organization Report and Initiative
Evaluation Report, and publications prepared for a National Forum on Linking Ready Kids and Ready Schools. DCA
interviewed 25 individuals involved with SPARK, including
current and former Kellogg managers, program and evaluation staff; grantees; educators and school administrators;
community and business partners; and the five resource
organizations that supported SPARK. In the course of its
work with SPARK, DCA also initiated discussions with
67 national organizations representing early childhood
education and care, state and local education policymakers, parent- and family-serving groups, business organizations, and education and early care thought leaders. Those
discussions informed many observations in this article.
2
The National School Readiness Indicators Project identified the following components of school readiness: physical
well-being and motor development, social and emotional
development, approaches to learning, language development, and cognition and general knowledge.
3
The Foundation for Child Development, Graustein Memorial Fund, David and Lucille Packard Foundation, Annie
E. Casey Foundation and the Council for Chief State School
Officers were among a small group of organizations that
had made a priority of working toward greater alignment of
K-12 and community-based early care and education.
1
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value, educational attainment, even social rank.
Practically speaking, it presented yet another
layer of work for education systems that already
felt just about stretched to the limit. One grantee
observed that a Head Start program had existed
for years next door to an elementary school, but
the preschool director had never been successful
at establishing any relationship with the kindergarten teachers. The school principal saw the
value, but had many other more urgent priorities. There was no outside pressure to push for a
tangible link between the two systems.
Yet, nationally there was growing focus in
education, policy, and philanthropic spheres on
creating a continuum of learning for children and
better alignment across the educational spectrum, as evidenced by the emergence of P-3 and
P-20 councils in a number of states (Communications Consortium Media Center, 2009). The time
appeared ripe for a system-building initiative
that moved beyond the theoretical to developing
models for young children’s learning and school
readiness at the community level that could yield
lessons to be applied nationally.

SPARK Overview
Kellogg saw the logic of linking the pre-K and
kindergarten worlds. It banked the SPARK investment on a belief that creating common expectations between the two sectors, building effective
transitions from one to the next, and engaging
parents to a much higher degree would be fruitful. Additionally, the foundation recognized that
such an effort would require as much “horsepower” as possible, which meant reaching out to
community and governmental partners to move
the idea forward and give it life beyond the length
of the initiative. As one educator involved in the
initiative put it, SPARK represented “a container
in which all the people and organizations involved
in early childhood education could articulate a
new system.” It was “the most comprehensive, coherent vision for the state and the school system
to rally around three and four-year-olds” that this
person had ever seen.
SPARK was launched in 2001 with eight grantees
in the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia,
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Hawaii, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, and Ohio, representing urban and rural
school communities and preschool traditions and
practices of widely divergent character. While the
target population was children ages 3 to 6 who
were at risk for struggling in school, SPARK progress would benefit all children, vulnerable or not.
Like most large-scale, multiyear initiatives, the
SPARK evaluation story is complicated to tell
and is still unfolding, with longitudinal studies
following SPARK preschoolers through the early
grades. Some figures sketch the outline. Kellogg’s
investment was $58.5 million over the seven years
and the grantees were able to leverage that for an
additional $106 million in financial and in-kind
services to support their strategies and programs.
Grantees report that 8,100 vulnerable children
received services, which aided their preparation
for, and transition to, kindergarten. Strategies
in place for 2009 and 2010 would bring nearly
18,000 more children into the SPARK “ready kids,
ready schools” realm (Walter R. McDonald Associates, 2009).
Five out of seven SPARK sites demonstrated
that their students outperformed children from
similar backgrounds for kindergarten readiness.
The children served by two grantees performed
as well as their peers, despite the SPARK children’s vulnerabilities. Six grantees provided data
from the first grade; two showed their students
outperforming peers, while four others were on
par. Data into second grade weren’t as available,
although children at one site were doing better
than their peers and children at a second site were
doing as well as their peers (Walter R. McDonald
Associates, 2009).
It is important to note, however, that each grantee
has successfully positioned itself to continue the
work: They have all begun the systems change
work, forged the partnerships, energized the
stakeholders, and raised up the SPARK notion of
ready kids and ready schools to a level that won’t
allow it to recede. There is a connotation to the
word “initiative” in philanthropic circles that implies initiatives stop when all the money has been
spent. The consensus of SPARK grantees is that
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they are equipped, and committed, to carry on.
Developing a Theory of Change
The “container aspect” referenced earlier was
a product of the SPARK initiative’s theory of
change, which was developed by foundation staff
with substantial input from leaders in the field
of early childhood education. According to staff
involved in this process, no Kellogg initiative
had ever been so keyed to the development of
and agreement to a theory of change. In fact, the
foundation board held funding back for launching
SPARK until the theory of change was in place – a
decision that offered grantees and their partners
clear direction while giving them the freedom to
adapt to their individual circumstances.

Arriving at the theory of change
proved to be a long, painful process
for foundation staff. It forced
those involved to explore their own
understanding of – and then agree
on – how progress occurs on a large
scale. But it yielded a durable result.
Arriving at the theory of change proved to be
a long, painful process for foundation staff. It
forced those involved to explore their own understanding of – and then agree on – how progress
occurs on a large scale. But it yielded a durable
result. One important aspect of the theory was
that progress was essential on three fronts: “ready
kids, ready schools, and ready communities.”
Furthermore, it made clear that this progress
required the synergistic efforts of two basic types
of partners: partners that have a direct involvement in children’s lives, who were best positioned
to design and manage a more effective system to
serve them; and partners who control or influence
resources and policy, who were best positioned to
provide a supportive environment for the system
and work toward its sustainability.
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FIGURE 1 SPARK Theory of Change

The SPARK theory of change (Figure 1) was
significant because it helped reconcile an ongoing internal debate about whether social change
is a product of grassroots organizing or top-down
leadership. The theory explained how it is a
product of both. Parents, community-based early
childhood educators, and elementary schools
drive change by providing a well-grounded perspective on what supports children and families
need in order to achieve school readiness, and
work directly to create systems that provide those
supports. School-system leaders, government,
leaders and other education policymakers assist,
expand, and sustain change by setting priorities,
providing funding, and establishing supportive
policies. Influential groups such as business leaders and child advocates serve as important intermediaries between these two groups by drawing
attention to needs, promising solutions, and the
benefits they offer. The SPARK theory of change
framed the initiative and shaped the evaluation
plan. By all accounts, the spirit of the work that
resulted came very close to what the theory of
change predicted.
82

The theory of change elicited worry, complaints,
and confusion among the grantees when they
first saw it. As it took hold, though, grantees said
that it added real value to their work. Some hung
poster representations of the theory of change in
conference rooms to use almost like a road map.
Others used it as a presentation tool, especially to
outside groups like the Chamber of Commerce.
One project director said it helped them “focus
on who was not at the table. It gave us a visual
to show the complex networks and linkages we
needed to institutionalize change. It highlighted
grassroots, while elevating the work to the next
level.” The power of the theory of change to focus
the work was essential to grantees in moving the
effort forward.

Managing Change Making Versus
Grantmaking
Kellogg was organized around the traditional
foundation model of program directors holding a
certain number of projects in their portfolios and
working independently of their colleagues. With
SPARK, the foundation set off in a new direction
THE
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and envisioned a structure that gathered a number of program directors and staff from multiple
functions (such as communications and evaluation) together as a team. The idea was to bring a
wide range of talents and experience to bear on
this ambitious national initiative (Appendix A).
This new structure also called for a new way of
interacting with grantees. It left behind the customary, more laissez faire relationship between
program director and grantee, calling for Kellogg
staff to be much more involved with and supportive of the sites. The theory was that each site’s
work would be guided by a common understanding of the initiative’s goals forged among the
program directors. Learning and successful strategies would emerge from each site and be shared
among the entire initiative’s participants.
Very early on, however, flaws in that structure
began to surface. Foremost was that the staff serving on SPARK had a variety of reporting relationships rather than reporting to one individual who
had ultimate responsibility for the overall success
of the initiative. This created an imperative for
consensus that was very difficult to achieve: No
matter how much work went into reaching agreement, program directors’ individual experiences
and interests constantly overrode the common
understanding.
The lack of a unified reporting structure also
undermined the ability to coordinate staff activities and the messages they imparted to sites in
the crucial early stages. As a result, throughout
its early implementation phase, SPARK basically
operated like eight separate initiatives, resulting
in confusion and frustration among grantees and
WKKF staff. Lines of authority and responsibility
were obscured, which diminished a strong sense
of owning the initiative within the foundation. At
the same time, while the foundation was asking
staff to operate in an entirely different way, staff
performance was still tied to how many grants
each program director was getting out the door.
That wasn’t the kind of performance measure to
promote effective teamwork.
The multiple-program-director model also laid
bare an unresolved, yet critically important, ques2011 Vol 2:3

tion: How directive should the foundation be in
terms of what it expected of the sites? Some staff
felt the sites should be free to find their own way,
since only they had the knowledge to adapt to and
capitalize on local characteristics, as well as the
experience to build systems that were truly effective for their children. Others felt that stronger
guidance was needed, since sites were charting
new territory and could benefit from a national
perspective.

The multiple-program-director
model also laid bare an unresolved,
yet critically important, question:
How directive should the foundation
be in terms of what it expected of the
sites?
By the end of SPARK’s second year, it became
apparent that the foundation’s staffing structure
was a roadblock. Sites were doing good work and
making progress, yet they were struggling to envision the broader change they were working toward. What were the most essential components
of the systems they were creating? What were the
keys to the success of those systems? What were
they learning that could move the entire cause of
school readiness forward nationally?
Unless SPARK could answer those questions and
achieve greater clarity, it would have limited ability to contribute to national progress or even have
significant impact in SPARK states. It was plain
that the initiative required more unified leadership from Kellogg, and a management structure
that supported a cohesive vision and consistency
in working with individual sites and advancing
the initiative as a whole.
In response, the foundation collapsed the multiple-director model into three foundation managers and combined program and evaluation into
the ongoing program management structure (Appendix B). The smaller foundation team provided
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FIGURE 2 Shared Vision of SPARK Impact

Every child will …

•
•
•
•

experience a continuum of success – before school, upon entering school, and through the early
school years – in acquiring and using learning skills.
be supported by adults and institutions who understand what a child needs at each stage of
development, are equipped for their role, and communicate with one another.
be at the center of a system that values him or her as an individual and is determined to provide the
foundation for lifelong success.
be eager to learn, confident in his or her skills, and at home in learning environments.

Every parent will …

•
•
•

be more knowledgeable about their child’s learning, social, and physical development and how to
nurture it.
be prepared to be proactive in advocating for their child with the professionals and institutions that
serve their child.
be welcomed as partner in education, with a restored sense of school ownership.

Every school will…

•
•
•
•

view early childhood education as central component of its mission and key to student/school success.
have highly qualified teachers and staff to serve young children, as well as well-defined approaches to
ensure performance.
view itself as a critical part of a larger early childhood education partnership, and be open and proactive
in working with other members of that partnership to ensure child’s continuum of success.
value every child, and strengthen its performance by continuous assessments of child’s learning skills
and needs.

In every community …

•
•

child-serving professionals and institutions will share the goal of ensuring early learning success and will
work together to achieve it.
a new early care and education system will lead to greater sense of purpose and satisfaction, highperforming schools, and fewer social problems.

some immediate relief to grantees. It eliminated
conflicting directions and streamlined reporting.
Kellogg staff, though, still struggled with how to
approach the partnership with grantees.
The desire was to strike a balance between being
overly prescriptive and too open-ended. Kellogg
was striving for empowered, insightful grantees
that could discover for themselves what would be
most effective for their communities, yet benefit
from a more clearly defined vision of success as
well as strategic input on the problems they were
trying to solve. Kellogg wanted out of the powerplay dynamic that can infect philanthropic work
and to work as a team with the grantees. Teamwork, though, requires trust, and trust takes time
to build. Even with the smaller management team
in place, grantees still felt somewhat adrift.
Momentum shifted when the new management
team signaled clear Kellogg staff ownership for
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the initiative. They declared Kellogg’s intention to
be not only a champion for the grantees, but also
a leader in ensuring that SPARK produced results
that could have national significance (Crutchfield & McLeod Grant, 2008). The reconfigured
management team convened all the SPARK site
leaders to develop a shared vision of the future
they were working toward collectively.
The resulting vision (Figure 2) was significant because it unified the initiative, clarified the impact
SPARK intended to produce, and helped elevate
what had been a programmatic orientation to a
cause orientation. For some grantees this came
naturally and they defined their work in systemschange terms. But others had a more programmatic lens and moving to this cause view was a
struggle. Both kinds of grantees, though, came to
understand that through the cause orientation,
SPARK leaders were explicitly seeking to create
powerful and lasting change on a large scale for
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young children, their families, and their communities, and Kellogg explicitly sought to help guide
and accelerate similar progress nationally.

allies as well. One superintendent of a SPARK
site system balked at the pilot size of the program, arguing that pilots belie the urgency of the
problem: “It’s like using a garden hose on a forest
The Kellogg management team strongly and
fire,” he said. The price for his cooperation was
consistently encouraged sites to identify systemstraightforward: Work to convert all my schools
building approaches that had proven highly effec- to ready schools or take your initiative elsewhere.
tive in building transition and alignment between The Kellogg management team joined with site
preschool and kindergarten, and had the potential leaders in meeting with him and, with the foundato be adopted on a broad scale. They urged the
tion’s backing, the local SPARK team accepted the
sites to clarify the end results they were seeking
challenge. Looking back, the superintendent said
for their states or municipalities. They reassured
that Kellogg could have easily have walked away,
each site that it didn’t need to create a “perfect”
but didn’t because it had a clear commitment to
system, but insisted that it produce and scale up
the work and to achieving a major result.
approaches that could contribute substantially to
a better system. The underlying assumption was
that the sites would produce a range of approaches that could form important elements of a highly
The resulting vision was
functioning system and, in so doing, together
significant because it unified the
inform national progress.

initiative, clarified the impact

The Kellogg team underscored their commitment
to the theory of change, and helped sites use it as
a guide to determine how they could move from
system development on a local scale to adoption
of their systems and associated best practices on a
large scale. This, too, helped elevate SPARK sites
from a program-level focus to an emphasis on
broader impact.

SPARK intended to produce, and
helped elevate what had been a
programmatic orientation to a
cause orientation.

SPARK leaders and their key allies now knew
what was expected of them, but understood that
there were few restraints on how they got there.
Kellogg had found its way out of the “prescription
dilemma,” as one subject called it, and set a true
partnership in motion.

Another SPARK ally reported that the “whole
constellation of the foundation and the resource
organizations made a big difference. They were
troubleshooters and advisors.” He noted that the
public policy and economic development arguments were very valuable.4

That was a turning point. Some SPARK sites at
first resisted the need to focus their strategies and
elevate the scope of their ambitions, but relatively
quickly all embraced the idea that doing so gave
them greater clarity of purpose and a clearer
path to success. Equally important, SPARK had
transitioned from a collection of projects to what
it had originally been intended to be: a coherent
initiative that could achieve national impact.

“We were a group of business folks with very
little knowledge of early education,” he said, but
their involvement with SPARK led to “discussions
at a deep level” and spurred them to investigate
and compare other models for early education.
Their work with SPARK has convinced them that
improvements in early education are not only the
right thing to do, but also are a wise investment
that will benefit everyone over the long term.

The Kellogg commitment to large-scale progress
had a significant effect on important SPARK site
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The Committee on Economic Development’s ongoing
work on the cost/benefit of early education investment was
influential.
4

85

Greeley and Greeley

A Different Path for Technical Assistance
A question Kellogg faced from the outset of
SPARK was how to ensure that sites gained the
benefit of expertise they would need to succeed.
As noted earlier, the eight grantees had a range
of experience and ability in thinking in systemschange terms, creating powerful collaborations,
and advocating at the highest levels of policymaking realms; and the SPARK management
team had specific ideas about the kind of knowhow that would move the grantees’ work forward.
Another concern was insuring the continuity of
assistance from site to site; since they were linked
in a national initiative, it was important that the
sites received consulting of the same kind and
caliber. As a solution, Kellogg decided to forgo
the more traditional technical assistance route –
providing funding to each grantee to hire its own
outside consulting – and to assemble instead a
collection of consultant groups that the foundation would offer to the sites to support their
SPARK work. Kellogg referred to this network as
“resource organizations.”
As the initiative unfolded, however, an additional
role for the resource organizations materialized.
Foundation staffing, keyed to the portfoliomanagement model, is typically very stable. The
scale of the SPARK initiative, and its essence as
a change-making operation that called for much
deeper and sustained involvement, overwhelmed
the capacity of the Kellogg team. The resource
organizations became an extra “set of hands” for
Kellogg to manage and assist the grantees with
everything that was happening at the site level.
The first network of resource organizations and
the attempts to connect them to the sites did not
live up to the management team’s expectations.
Like the struggle over how prescriptive the foundation should be in the overall work, Kellogg was
seeking balance deploying the resource organizations. It viewed the network as a strategic investment in the work to accelerate progress at the site
and national levels, but it didn’t want to foist the
group on grantees. The resource organizations
were meant to represent to grantees that the
foundation didn’t consider itself to have all the
answers, that it truly wanted to engage in a part-
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nership with the sites and offer resources they
could use in the way that would best help them.
But, like the mixed signals in the early management structure, the open-endedness of the
arrangement made it difficult for grantees to see
how the resource organizations’ particular skills
and processes could move them forward. Some
perceived Kellogg’s stance toward the resource
organizations as ambivalent, while others viewed
working with them as an added requirement of
the foundation rather than as a benefit. The confusion and discomfort with the arrangement was
generally evident to Kellogg staff and the resource
groups, but it was also communicated directly to
them by many of the grantees.
After this unsuccessful beginning effort to
connect sites with external assistance, Kellogg
recalibrated its resource-organization team and
how it wanted that team to function. The new
team included expertise in communications,
evaluation, leadership development, community
engagement, cause visioning, and policy development. Kellogg presented the resource organizations and their capabilities to SPARK sites in
initiativewide meetings and gave them substantive roles in those sessions. Those meetings gave
grantees a tangible sense of the kind of assistance
the resource organizations could provide. As the
grantees developed a clearer understanding of
the broad change they were seeking and the pathway to that change, they could envision how the
consultants’ services would work for their efforts.
Another important management decision was to
re-orient the relationship between the foundation
and the resource organizations. The foundation
encouraged the resource organizations to take
intellectual ownership of the initiative and use
their own discretion in guiding, assisting, and
motivating grantees. It brought the resourceorganization network, independent of the sites,
together on a regular basis for sessions to develop
site- and initiative-level strategy, help coordinate
resource organization activities, and share the
foundation’s perspectives. The result was that
resource organizations shifted their view of Kellogg from “client” to “partner,” which freed them
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to weigh in with vigor on strategies relating to the
initiative as a whole.
Ultimately, the resource organizations had an
impact on nearly every site. One grantee said,
“If we had known early on what we know now
about the resource organizations, we could have
seen even more possibilities.” In concert with the
Kellogg team, the resource organizations helped
grantees define where they were most likely to
succeed and to chart a path to make it happen.
The resource organizations became “thought
partners” for grantees. One remarked, “We are
a small organization and had a gap in resources.
We needed someone who can think and plan
strategically.”
Sites benefited from being able to speak frankly
to people with an outside perspective and different experience and skills. One site leader offered
that the resource organization with which she
worked closely “opened us up to new ideas that
we wouldn’t have thought about ourselves.”
Grantees drew on resource organizations to
establish their evaluation plans, to create entirely
new alliances, to link their work with others
around the country, to discover funding streams,
and to keep going. “We wouldn’t have made it
without them,” one grantee said. “They pushed
us, made meetings happen, helped us make connections.”
Resource organizations also played key roles in
developing core SPARK messages and encouraging their consistent application, and in defining
key concepts, such as the characteristics of ready
schools, that helped guide site work.
The process of putting the resource organizations
together was intentional on Kellogg’s part, but
how well the group functioned was unexpected.
The combined resource-organization network
was noncompetitive and extremely collaborative.
Each one’s work informed the others’ and the exchanges were substantive. In an effort as far-flung
as SPARK, coherence isn’t easy to reach or maintain. The resource organizations contributed to a
sense of connection among the sites and between
the sites and Kellogg. They emphasized what the
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sites had in common and what they were doing
that had national significance. One observed that
the resource organizations created “our-ness” for
the SPARK initiative among all its players.

Resource organizations shifted
their view of Kellogg from “client” to
“partner,” which freed them to weigh
in with vigor on strategies relating to
the initiative as a whole.
There were major contributing factors to this
success. First, the Kellogg management team
carefully selected the resource organizations
not only for their expertise, but also for their
perceived compatibility and their interest in the
cause. Second, participation in the network had
sustained involvement from the highest echelons
at each firm. Lastly, Kellogg treated the resource
organizations as an extension of their management team in a shared cause, rather than vendors
enlisted to execute tasks or functions. That said,
the job of building and sustaining the resourceorganization network was arduous and required
a significant investment in management time and
dollars.

Advocacy and the ‘Soft Power’ of
Foundations
A nationally known foundation like Kellogg
has the capacity to be a powerful advocate for
change. But how can that capacity be realized to
its greatest effect? SPARK provided some useful
lessons.
Historically, Kellogg has been reluctant to play
a highly visible role as advocate. The foundation
defers to the people and institutions who are
directly involved in an issue that it is supporting. SPARK, though, required something more.
The idea of ready schools – of creating a bridge
between the worlds of community-based early
education and the traditional K-12 educational
system – was so difficult and controversial that it
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The idea of ready schools – of
creating a bridge between the
worlds of community-based early
education and the traditional K-12
educational system – was so difficult
and controversial that it was critical
for Kellogg to lend its name more
directly to this effort. There was
a need for national leadership in
drawing these two worlds together
in order to create a more fertile
environment for SPARK sites and
for the impact of the initiative as a
whole.
was critical for Kellogg to lend its name more directly to this effort. There was a need for national
leadership in drawing these two worlds together
in order to create a more fertile environment for
SPARK sites and for the impact of the initiative as
a whole.
Kellogg had the advantages of national recognition and being viewed as unallied between the
two sectors. But to be effective, the foundation
needed a sound understanding of the landscape of
potential support. Accordingly, Kellogg staff and
one of its resource organizations had in-depth
conversations with numerous national leaders
in multiple sectors,5 in many cases representing
membership organizations whose constituencies
The organizations engaged in this process served a broad
range of constituencies, including Head Start and other
early childhood education providers; public school system
superintendents, elementary school principals, K-12
teachers, school board members and Title I administrators;
elected officials at the local and state levels; businesses;
parents; chief state school officers; social-service entities;
philanthropies; advocacy groups; and early childhood
education thought leaders.
5
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are essential to the development of ready schools
on a significant scale.
These discussions revealed substantial national
interest in the development of “ready schools” – a
core component of the systems SPARK was seeking to create. Leaders did not view creating ready
schools as a cause unto itself, but instead as a key
component of the cause of ensuring the educational success of young children. They found the
vision articulated by SPARK leaders to be compelling, and they agreed with a ready school definition that includes strong community connection,
recognizing that external support – support of
individuals and institutions outside of schools
themselves – is essential to create ready schools at
full scale. Overwhelmingly, these leaders agreed
that more work needed to be done to strengthen
the role of schools in order to advance the schoolreadiness movement, and they welcomed Kellogg’s leadership in this regard.
When Kellogg and its resource organization
reported this interest back to SPARK grantees,
it had a tangible effect. They derived confidence
from this strong national support and were
motivated to envision their ready-schools work
as a major contribution to the advancement of
early childhood education. They were able to
tackle such highly charged issues as preschool
teacher training and certification, the re-ordering
of Title 1 funding, and the shared responsibility
of schools in making sure that both children and
schools are ready for student success starting at
kindergarten.
The foundation then tried to move the discussion
to the next logical step among a select group of
these national leaders. The hope was to develop a
platform for federal and state policy change that
would advance the new framework for early education that SPARK represented: a comprehensive
approach that sought to align the entire earlylearning continuum, from preschool right into the
early grades. Toward that end, Kellogg convened
three meetings. Unfortunately they were unable to chart a shared path forward, so Kellogg
decided to set its own course.
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Kellogg staff, together with members of its resource organizations, formed a team to develop
a plan to translate the community-based lessons learned from SPARK into policy change at
the state and federal levels. The plan focused on
advancing two concepts central to the SPARK
framework: transition – ensuring that children
have continuous success in learning and moving
from one phase of progress to the next, from birth
through the early grades; and alignment – ensuring that the systems that serve young children
are capable and effective in assisting that smooth
progress.

The Kellogg Foundation engaged state governors
to conduct transition and alignment forums in
five states: Arizona, Connecticut, Mississippi,
Ohio, and Pennsylvania. These forums proved
effective.

The SPARK team’s in-depth analysis of state policies indicated that while no state had a comprehensive policy on transition and alignment, several were primed to develop one. Further, Head
Start reauthorizing legislation was under way,
which was prompting states to think about this
policy area. In each of these states, however, there
were only disjointed discussions and no unifying
way of talking about policies and practices. Thus,
the team’s goals were to:

lessons learned from SPARK into

1. connect experts on transition and alignment policy and practices to the governors
and key state education policymakers at the
forefront of early childhood education;
2. provide information that could deepen and
accelerate their ongoing work;

Kellogg staff, together with members
of its resource organizations,
formed a team to develop a plan
to translate the community-based
policy change at the state and
federal levels.
Overall, the planning process for these forums
helped state leaders crystallize their purpose and
goals in advancing early childhood education. It
also led states to develop conceptual frameworks
on transition and alignment where none had been
articulated before. The policy insights from the
governors’ forums were captured in a Kellogg
publication, with the Educational Commission of
the States, entitled Linking Ready Kids to Ready
Schools, which serves as a resource for other
states looking to formally link the preschool and
early education systems.

3. motivate governors to prioritize Transitions
from Early Learning to Early Grades and the
alignment of curricula between the two in
both their early learning and education agendas;

At the national level, Kellogg Vice President
Greg Taylor provided testimony on SPARK to
the full U.S. Senate Finance Committee as part of
hearings on “Realizing Competitive Education:
Identifying Needs, Partnerships, and Resources.”
In addition, the Kellogg Foundation joined with
4. create a cadre of governors who could
the Education Commission of the States, Voices
champion this area of policy as a key compofor America’s Children, the Children’s Leadership
nent of early learning and education policies
Council, and select members of the Learning First
to other governors and to federal policymakAlliance in conducting a national forum in Washers; and
ington, D.C., on Linking Ready Kids to Ready
Schools for members of Congress, their staffs, and
5. position Transition and Policy Alignment as other leaders.
a key component of emerging discussion on
P-16 education framework.
The effect of Kellogg’s leadership was to create a new climate for dialogue, breaking down
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ingrained attitudes and practices and opening
minds. As one grantee put it, “Changing minds
has been the biggest job.” Prior to SPARK, there
was no real outside pressure for educators, communities, and parents to talk about, or understand, the value of ready schools. The theory of
change insisted on making those connections and
having those conversations. One grantee reported
that the Kellogg “name effect” was extremely important to drawing in outside partners and allies.
Strategies like the governors’ forums underscored
SPARK values and brought a sense of urgency to
the work. Importantly, the forums and Kellogg’s
congressional testimony elevated the grantees and
their allies. “Five years ago, the governor wouldn’t
give us the time of day,” one grantee said. “Now
we’re on the inside.”

SPARK also offers important lessons
for philanthropic institutions
dedicated to social change on a
national scale. Perhaps the most
important lesson is that success can
depend upon their ability to lead

ees did not flourish. The concept of a national
advocacy partnership had tremendous appeal, but
implementing it proved difficult.

Summary
The view among grantees and their partners
and allies is that SPARK will go down as a “game
changer” in school readiness. The initiative raised
the national consciousness, and the willingness to
act, on ensuring that children are ready for school
and schools are ready for them. SPARK sites will
be the vanguard for that movement.
But SPARK also offers important lessons for philanthropic institutions dedicated to social change
on a national scale. Perhaps the most important
lesson is that success can depend upon their ability to lead – to clearly define an end result and to
take responsibility for its achievement. While giving primacy to the role of grantees in creating approaches that suit their communities, foundations
must recognize and respect their own role as well:
Grantees want foundations’ guidance, especially
in taking their efforts to a level they have never
before attempted. They want the benefit of knowledge and resources foundations have developed
by working on a national scale. And they need the
active influence of these foundations in creating a
more supportive environment for their work.

– to clearly define an end result

Foundations must be flexible in their approaches
while remaining committed to achieving tangible
progress. Social change is by nature a process of
achievement.
discovery, so there will always be a need to change
tactics and even strategies when they aren’t working. But this must be done with a relentless focus
That kind of success notwithstanding, one grantee on an end result. The Kellogg Foundation, like its
commented that “there is an unfinished feeling
grantees, often struggled during the SPARK inito the national policy piece”; other participants
tiative. But because it shared their determination
shared similar views. There is a sense that Kellogg to succeed, the struggle paid off.
could have used its influence to more actively
engage high-level state education policymakers
Perhaps a final lesson is that success requires
and leaders from the SPARK states to give them
patience and persistence. SPARK was a sevenan appreciation of the scope of the ready-schools year initiative. During that time, grantees and the
work and nascent ready-schools movement.
Kellogg Foundation itself found their way through
Grantees, resource organizations, and the founda- the highly complex work of building new systems
tion alike were disappointed that links between
of early childhood education and arrived at a level
the national organizations engaged in school
of clarity that allowed them to influence progress
readiness and ready schools issues and the grant- on a large scale.

and to take responsibility for its
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APPENDIX

SPARK	
  Phase	
  II:	
  Basic	
  management	
  structure	
  (initial	
  implementation)	
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  Partners	
  have	
  primary	
  reporting	
  relationship	
  to	
  a	
  different	
  VP)	
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Lead	
  PD	
  

Lead	
  
Support	
  
Grantees	
  

RO’s	
  

PD	
  

PD	
  

Grantee	
  

Grantee	
  

Grantee	
  

Grantee	
  

PD	
  

PD	
  

PD	
  

Internal	
  
Partners	
  

Grantee	
  

Grantee	
  

Grantee	
  

Evaluation	
  
Mgr.	
  
RO	
  

Comm.	
  
Mgr.	
  
RO’s	
  

Policy	
  Mgr.	
  

RO’s	
  

Meeting	
  
Svcs.	
  Mgr.	
  

	
  

VPP	
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  Vice	
  President	
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PD	
  =	
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  Director	
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Comm.	
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APPENDIX B SPARK Management Structure Evolution

SPARK	
  Phase	
  II/III:	
  Basic	
  management	
  structure	
  (revised)	
  
(Internal	
  Partners	
  have	
  primary	
  reporting	
  relationship	
  to	
  a	
  different	
  VP)	
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